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Climate change, non-identity and moral ontology
by Jonathan M. Hoffmann 
mined by its genome which is a product of a certain ovum and a 
certain sperm cell (112-113). On this view, we may then evaluate 
an action by considering its impact on each individual that is 
 affected. An action is, thus, better or worse because it is better or 
worse for someone.
Consequently, there may be alternative actions available to per-
form that seem better or worse, but aren’t really, as they are not 
better or worse for someone. One example that illustrates this 
point is the case of a 14-year-old who decides to have a child 
and, due to her age, gives the boy she conceives a bad start in life 
(113). In response, one may want to argue that she should have 
had a child later and that that child would have had a better start 
in life. This, however, overlooks that the boy that has been born 
to the young mother could not have been born later: the child she 
actually had could only come into existence because she decided 
to become a mother when she was 14. Hence, Parfit argues, we 
can “not claim that, in having this child, what she did was worse 
for him” (113, italics in the original).3
Let us now turn to the wide person-affecting view. On this view, we 
may not consider the effect on each individual but should consid-
er the overall wellbeing of all individuals for each available action. 
y students tend to rank Parfit’s Energy Policy and the 
Further Future1 among their favourite pieces. It is 
a marvellously argued, eye-opening paper. One of 
the most interesting passages comes right at the end, when Parfit 
suggests that we should act as if we had never realised that the 
non-identity problem exists:
“When we are discussing social policies, should we ignore the 
point about personal identity? Should we allow ourselves to say 
that a choice like that of the Risky Policy or of Depletion might 
be against the interests of people in the further future? This is not 
true. Should we pretend that it is? […] I would not want people 
to conclude that we can be less concerned about the more remote 
effects of our social policies. So I would be tempted to suppress the 
argument for this conclusion.” (2010 [1983], 119)
In the paper, Parfit continuously stresses the implications of our 
views on personal identity. He differentiates between what he later, 
in his Reasons and Persons, calls a “narrow” and a “wide” person- 
affecting view (1984, ch. 18).2 On a narrow person-affecting view, 
we take seriously each person’s identity and assume that it is deter-
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Taking this perspective, it does not matter whether the individuals 
that are affected are identical to those individuals that would have 
been affected had another option been taken. The wide person- 
affecting view is ignorant regarding personal identity. Accordingly, 
on a wide person-affecting view, a decision can be better or worse 
despite not being better or worse for someone. In the case of the 
young girl, this view underpins Parfit’s intuition that she should 
have waited, for the child that would have been born later would 
have had a better start in life and overall wellbeing would assumedly 
have been higher. So, on this view, one can say that the mother 
acted wrongly as she could have done better by having a child later. 
Parfit contends that the wide person-affecting view must be 
broadly utilitarian in its approach, as he believes that an appeal to 
rights cannot solve the problem – people would rather waive their 
rights than not be born at all.4 In Reasons and Persons (ch. 17, 18 
and 19), he discusses some versions of the wide person-affecting 
view and finds that they also have troubling consequences, among 
them the repugnant conclusion and the mere addition-paradox.
To sum up. On the narrow person-affecting view, we are not able 
to say that the girl wronged her child, while Parfit’s wide person- 
affecting view allows us to say she did wrong. However, the wide 
person-affecting view has some very undesirable consequences, too.
My suggestion, then, is this: let us adopt a more plausible ver-
sion of a wide person-affecting view. As Jeffrey Reiman argues,5 
we should make use of Rawls’s original position6 when thinking 
about non-identity cases. Rawls designs the original position as 
the fair circumstances for a hypothetical contract that can be im-
agined by any individual to have access to. Because of the veil of 
ignorance, people in the original position lack any knowledge of 
their personal identity, their capabilities, their age, gender, race, 
intelligence, status, etc. Importantly, they also don’t know the 
generation they belong to. Such a view of persons may also be 
called the “citizen type” view.7 Instead of focusing on the indivi-
dual “token” with all its personal features, we should only consider 
the “type” with its “identity independent features”.8
On such a view we can consider various hypothetical outcomes 
of policy options and compare them, but without the need to 
aggregate the wellbeing of all those (possibly) affected and with-
out falling for the repugnant conclusion and the like, while at the 
same time being able avoid the non-identity trap that may lead 
us to conclude that the wellbeing of people in the far future is 
morally insignificant. In the case of the young girl we can, on this 
view, say that she did wrong her child as she did not fulfil his right 
to normal functioning.9
What this comment thus suggests is (a) that we should carefully 
reflect upon which view on personal identity we employ when 
we think about our responsibility to future people, for example 
with regard to the climate crisis, and (b) that a Rawls-inspired 
“citizen-type” view may provide a good stance for such reason-
ing. Indeed, on such a view, there is no need to “suppress” the 
argument as Parfit suggests for the narrow person-affecting view. 
Furthermore, there is then also no reason to worry – as the call for 
opinion pieces for this volume does – whether “the NIP logic [is] 
misleading if carried over directly to climate change.”10
Jonathan M. Hoffmann is writing his PhD thesis at the University of 
Warwick on the design of institutions for the future. He is one of two 
guest editors of this IGJR issue.
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